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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND UTILITY RATES

A Study of the Peoples Gas Case
Important from two aspects is the recent case of Peoples Gas Light
and Coke Company v. Slattery,' which sustains the Illinois Commerce
Commission in holding the Chicago gas rates down to their present level.
Firstly, the court's establishment of independent equity review of administrative rate orders in certain cases is noteworthy; and secondly, much of
value exists in the court's pronouncements on rates and valuation, particularly in view of the attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States
on the subject. It will be necessary to consider these matters separately.
(1) The Facts of the Case
The present gas rates have been in effect since 1934 through schedule
ICC No. 17, which was filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission. An
additional 3 per cent tax on its gross receipts 2 caused the Peoples Gas
Company to file with the Commission a new schedule (ICC No. 18), proposing a flat increase of 3 per cent to cover the tax. The Commission suspended this schedule for ten months and, after a hearing, entered a final
order cancelling it.
The Company then filed ICC No. 19, proposing certain increases in
minimum and other rates. On July 1, 1936, the Commission suspended this
new schedule until November 24 and set the case for hearing on July 15,
which hearing was held. On July 24, the Company petitioned the Commission to install No. 19 as temporary rates until a final order could be entered. The Commission entered an order denying this petition. The Company then filed a complaint in equity in the Circuit Court of Cook County
for temporary and permanent injunctions restraining the enforcement,
as confiscatory, of the existing rates in ICC No. 17.
The Circuit Court granted a temporary injunction on condition that
rates in excess of Schedule No. 19 would not be charged and that the additional money collected be impounded until a final adjudication. The Appellate Court stayed and later vacated the injunction. The Commission extended the suspension of Schedule No. 19 until May 24, 1937.
The case was heard by a Master, before whom, by stipulation, the
evidence at that time before the Commission was also introduced. On
May 21, 1937, the Commission entered a final order, cancelling No. 19 and
finding No. 17 to be reasonable and leaving it in force. In accord with the
1 373 Ill. 31 (1940). The Supreme Court of the United States has noted "no
substantial federal question." 84 L. Ed. (Adv.) 649 (1940).
2 While this tax was apparently the moving factor in the request for an increase, the Company, according to its brief, "was convinced that it was entitled
to an increase in rates far beyond the moderate increase which had been requested on the basis of the 3% tax act," which attitude eventually resulted in
ICC No. 19.
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amended complaint, the court then enjoined the enforcement of the order
on both schedules, requiring, however, an impounding of funds until a
final disposition on appeal. There was a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.
(2) Matters Relating to Procedure and Jurisdiction
There is a provision for statutory appeal from orders of the Commission. 3 Where a hearing is given, a rehearing must first be asked for before court appeal, and, where no hearing is given, a hearing must first be
asked before appeal is taken. 4 The temporary suspension of ICC No. 19
was of the type not requiring hearing, and hence should have been followed by a request for a hearing before court action; but the Illinois Supreme Court holds that the Company had complied with the statutory
command for a request when it petitioned that the new rates be installed
as temporary rates. The court's attempt to justify under the statute seems
unnecessary, because, with the appearance of the final order cancelling
No. 19, the controversy about the suspension order seems moot in this
connection.
The final order was entered after hearing, and, according to the statute, it should have been followed by a request for rehearing and an appeal
to the Circuit Court, the act providing that, when no appeal is taken,
"parties ... shall be deemed to have waived the right to have the merits
of the said controversy reviewed by a court .... "5 This would appear to
be an attempt on the part of the legislature to make the statutory appeal
the sole possible remedy, and this interpretation has been indicated by
previous Illinois cases, though these are distinguishable. 6
3 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 2/3, § 72.
4 "Within thirty days after the service of any order or decision of the Commission refusing an application for rehearing . . . or within thirty days after
the service of any final order ... upon and after a rehearing . . . any person or
corporation affected . . . may appeal to the circuit or superior court. . . . No
proceeding to contest any rule . . .which the Commission is authorized to issue
without a hearing and has so issued shall be brought in any court unless application shall have been first made to the Commission for a hearing thereon and
until after such application has been acted upon by the Commission ...
" Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 2/3, § 72.
5

Ibid.

6 "Appellees contend that the order is unreasonable and that the commission
should therefore be enjoined from enforcing it. The question of the reasonableness of the order cannot be determined in this proceeding. The Public Utilities
Act provides for a hearing before the commission upon that question, at which
the person or corporation complained of is entitled to be heard and to introduce
evidence, and if such person or corporation desires to contest the reasonableness
of the order made by the commission after such hearing, he or it is by the
act allowed an appeal to the circuit court of Sangamon County and a further
appeal to this court. The statutory method of reviewing the reasonableness of
orders of the commission is exclusive." City of Chicago v. O'Connell, 278
I1. 591 at 607, 116 N.E. 221 (1917), in which, however, the court went into the
question of whether the rate orders were void (as contrasted with unreasonable)
because of certain contracts with the municipality. Again, in Chicago North
Shore & Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. 360, 163 N.E. 141
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Whether such an interpretation, barring an independent suit in equity,
would be valid as constitutional depends upon the adequacy of the remedy
provided. The statute plays a role similar to that of the rule adopted by
judicial decision in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line7 by the United States
Supreme Court, to the effect that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before recourse to the courts. It was later declared, however, that
this is merely a rule of convenience and must give way to constitutional
right, as where it is charged that a rate now in effect is daily confiscating
property without due process of law and there is no provision for suspension of the rate during the administrative procedure.8
The act must also pass a test of validity upon a state constitutional
ground. The Illinois Constitution, vesting the circuit courts with original
jurisdiction in equity, 9 is construed to prohibit the legislature from de(1928), the court went into the question of whether certain contracts were binding
on the state, and, when the city attempted to attack a grant of tracks on the
question of public convenience and necessity, replied that the remedy by
appeal was exclusive as to this. The question whether the order was void
because of binding contracts was again treated in Hoyne v. Chicago & Oak
Park Elevated Railroad Co., 294 Ill.
413, 128 N.E. 587 (1920), and the complaint
requesting an injunction was dismissed, not for lack of jurisdiction, but simply
because binding contracts were not shown. In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Commission, 206 Ill. 109 at 112, 137 N.E. 449 (1922), it was
held that where the Commission has failed to find what would be a reasonable
rate, the remedy is not by bill in equity to enjoin the Commission from interfering with the rate set by the company, but by mandamus to order the Commission to find the reasonable rate. The court went on, "The statute gives the
public utility the right to apply for a rehearing, and upon a denial of what it
conceives to be its right an appeal to the circuit court. If the commission
makes no finding whether the proposed rates are just and reasonable and fails
or refuses to establish rates, the remedy by mandamus is clear, certain and
adequate to compel the performance of the duty imposed by the law. In either
event there is no ground for interference by a court of equity where no other
ground of equity jurisdiction exists." Italics are the author's. This last statement would appear to explain all of the above cases. In none of them was there
any reason why the appeal was not an adequate remedy at law, since there
were no questions raised, other than the contract questions of which the court
actually did take jurisiction, which might involve the constitutionality of matters
essentially temporary and requiring rapid action.
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 58 S. Ct. 199, 82 L. Ed.
276 (1937), the United States Court affirmed the denial of our courts of an
injunction on the ground that the remedy by appeal was adequate. However,
this was not a rate case, merely being an order that certain information be
filed, which order the Company should have asked the Commission to suspend.
Hence there was no day-by-day confiscation that required immediate court
action. One justice in the instant case concurs specially on the ground. that
this case shows the statutory remedy to be exclusive.
7 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908). See notes, 18 CI-CAGo-KmZT
LAW Rsvmw 74 at 81; 27 Col. L. Rev. 450; 35 Col. L. Rev. 230.
8 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 353, 67 L. Ed.
659 (1923); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 44
S. Ct. 553, 68 L. Ed. 975 (1924). See also Prendergast v. New York Telephone
Co., 262 U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466, 67 L. Ed. 853 (1923); United States v. Illinois C. R.
Co., 291 U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 471, 78 L. Ed. 909 (1934).

9 IlL Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 12.
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priving those courts of any of their equity jurisdiction unless an equally
sufficient remedy in the courts is provided to the person injured.' 0 There
is no doubt that, before the statute, the Circuit Courts did have jurisdiction to enjoin confiscatory rates." Hence, to run the gamut of both state
and federal Constitutions, the statute must provide a review which will
operate without allowing unlawful rates to confiscate the property of the
Company during the time that the review is pending.
The Supreme Court holds that the statute fails to meet this test, its
ground being that "it is not reasonable to suppose that any action on appeal to the circuit court would bring any relief pending hearing of the
main cause, either from disinclination of the commission to act, or from
the time it would necessarily take to prepare a record and get the cause
heard in the circuit court."' 2 This time lost would appear to be irrelevant
if, during this time, the new rates could be put in force. This can be done
easily,, and was done here, in an independent equity suit by means of a
temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of any rate below the
new one as confiscatory.
Whether the statutory appeal can afford such temporary relief is
more difficult. Where the appeal is brought to set aside an order of the
Commission setting a new rate, the court in its discretion may suspend
the order,' 3 which seems a near enough equivalent to the temporary injunction. However, before the appeal is allowed, there must be a petition
for rehearing, which the Commission has twenty days to answer, 14 and a
goodly sum can be lost through insufficient rates for twenty days. Thus it
would seem that the statutory appeal is an insufficient remedy even as to
such an order.
Furthermore, this suit asks, not merely that the court quash a new
rate set by the Commission, but that the court set aside an existing ratethat in Schedule 17-and itself install a new rate-that in Schedule 19during the hearing of the case. This would be impossible in a statutory
appeal for two reasons; (1) the act expressly bars a suspension of rates
where they have been in effect more than a year, 15 and those in Schedule
No. 17 have been in effect for such a period; and (2) it has been held that it
10 See Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 IM. 31 at 42 (1940);
Stephens v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 303 Ill.
49, 135 N.E. 68 (1922); Howell
v. Moores, 127 Ill. 67, 19 N.E. 863 (1899).
11 City of Chicago v. Rogers Park Water Co., 214 IMl. 212, 73 N.E. 375 (1905).
12 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31 at 45 (1940).
Is Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 2/3, § 75: ". . . during the pendency of such
appeal the circuit or superior court, or the Supreme Court, as the case may be,
in its discretion may stay or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the
Commission's rule, regulation, order or decision."
14 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 2/3, § 71.
15 "When any rate or other charge has been in force for any length of time
exceeding one year, and such rate or other charge is advanced by the public
utility and the order of the Commission reinstates such prior rate or other
charge, in whole or in part, no suspending order shall be allowed in any case
from such order pending the final determination of the case in the circuit or
superior court, or if appealed to the Supreme Court by such Supreme Court."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939. Ch. 111 2/3, § 75.
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16
is not the function of the Circuit Court on appeal to set rates, and this
is undoubtedly just as applicable to temporary rates as it is to permanent
ones. Hence Illinois now may be stated clearly to permit the injunctive
remedy at least in attempts to set aside already existing rates; and the
statement of the court is broad enough also to permit independent equity
relief against new rate orders, which seems justifiable in view of the reasons advanced above.
This broader interpretation is consistent with what the Supreme
Court then did in relation to the statute which provides that failure to pros17
ecute the statutory appeal deprives one of the right to judicial review.
Although the court did not declare the statute unconstitutional, it gave the
act a constitutional interpretation which rendered it absolutely inoperative and useless; in effect the court twists the statute into stating that
failure to prosecute the statutory appeal bars the right of statutory ap8
peal.'

(3) The Issue of Confiscation Under the Due Process Clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions
The court held that the real issue in this case was whether the existing schedule No. 17 was unconstitutional and not whether No. 19 was reasonable, since the judicial function would allow only enjoining but not fixing rates.
In deciding the fair valuation on which the rate should be calculated,
the court considered first land and then other property. Original cost of all
land used and useful was agreed to be $4,556,121. But as to present cost,
the testimony of the Company's witnesses differed with'the conclusion of
the Commission's witnesses about five millions. The Commission's finding
of the net present value of useful lands was $4,732,822, whereas the master
and chancellor found it to be almost eight millions. The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, sustained the Commission's finding because it could not
say that the finding was unreasonably low. 19
16 Illinois Commerce Commission ex rel. Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Chicago &
E. I. Ry. Co., 332 Ill. 243, 163 N.E. 664 (1928); Henderson County v. Chicago.
B. & Q. R. Co., 320 Ill. 608, 151 N.E. 542 (1926); Alton & S. R. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Commission, 316 IMl. 625, 147 N.E. 417 (1925); Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 40, 139 N.E. 867 (1923).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 2/3, § 72.
18 "This provision must be construed to apply to the procedure of reviewing
the acts of the commission by the statutory appeal provided, as otherwise it
would absolutely bar any relief in courts of equity and thus oust them from their
constitutional powers in cases where the statute does not provide for adequate
relief, and likewise would be a denial of the right of judicial review in cases
where the acts or omission of the commission violate constitutional guarantees."
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31 at 47 (1940).
19 "There is nothing definite and certain about the value of these several
tracts of real estate, other than the original cost. In the very nature of things
it is more or less a speculation depending upon which expert is believed. We
cannot say the value fixed by the Commission was shown to be unreasonably
low." 373 111. 31 at 50.
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As to other property, the original cost established was $111,330,067.67,
no opposing proof being offered by the Commission. However, a two-million dollar item which had previously been charged to expense was included in this, and this the Court rejected as improper.20 This seems
sound. Once the customers have furnished the money to buy an item, it
should not be used to raise the capital in order to create higher prices.
The Court, however, noted that the discrepancies in valuation figures
between those of the Commission and those of the Court and Master were
so "startling as to require an examination into methods used to arrive at
the different results."
The Company's witnesses arrived at a valuation of all property used
and useful of $165,682,411. This figure was reached by adding to the values
of land as before mentioned $156,709,359 reproduction cost new (first depreciated approximately 17%) and $15,000,000 for going value and $10,334,085 for working capital.
The Commission arrived at a valuation of property used and useful
of $120,000,000. This figure was based, according to the Supreme Court,
upon consideration of $127,869,677 reproduction cost new (which was then
depreciated 22%), the value of real estate as before stated, $7,500,000 for
working capital, and $7,200,000 for intangibles. The Court states that the
Commission did not base its conclusion entirely upon original cost or enof all the factirely upon reproduction cost new, but upon a combination
21
tors required in the so-called rule in Smyth v. Ames.
The Chancellor and Master arrived at a valuation of $147,497,418. This
was on the basis of straight reproduction cost. (The fact that this was
strictly reproduction cost was attempted to be traversed by the fact that
a witness took a so-called "original cost trended to present prices," meaning what the various assets would cost in present-day dollars. However,
the estimate varied only $300,000 from a straight reproduction estimate
and the witness himself referred to it as an appraisal of reproduction
cost.) A reproduction cost new of $150,467,084 was depreciated 15% and
added to the value of the land, $8,250,000 for working capital, and $7,200,000 for going value. This the Supreme Court rejected, as not considering
all the factors involved in the rule of Smyth v. Ames.
However, the Court pointed out that, merely because the method employed by the lower court was erroneous, the Commission was not necessarily right. It then went on to sustain the Commission's findings. Seemingly everyone in the case, Court, Commission, and Company, calculated
on the basis of reproduction cost, their only argument being as to what the
reproduction cost was. The Commission's valuation, however, was saved
seems clear that it is not proper to build up operating expenses and
20 "It
get the advantage of a rate authorized to cover them, and later change the
method of accounting to include such excess items as part of the investment of
the company, when, in reality, the money has been furnished by the customers
of the company." 373 Ill. 31 at 52.
The factors involved in
21 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
the rule are stated in the text, infra, above footnote 25.
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by the fact that it purported to consider the various irreconcilable factors
set down in Smyth v. Ames, among them both original and reproduction
cost; and since the figure arrived at exceeded the original cost, this constitutional requisite was satisfied.
Since the amount of the rate base is one of the factors which determines whether either of the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution 22 have been violated, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States are necessarily final on that subject. 23 That court has been
controlled by such a theory that a rate base which is below what it should
be is of necessity unconstitutional, apparently because the public's taking
of the use of the property at too low a rate is just as much taking property
for public use without compensation as is condemning property at too low
a price in eminent domain proceedings. 24 In attempting to find the valuation on which the rate should be calculated, the court met with difficulty
at the outset because of the fact that the price at which property should
be condemned is the fair market value, which, according to economic
theory, is the price at which a normal demand will purchase it-which in
turn, because of the natural desire of competing capital to seek profitable
channels of investment, is the capitalization of the earnings at a fair rate
of return.25 If the Supreme Court is to allow any regulation of rates at
all, it has, if it be consistent with its own theory, already allowed "confiscation." Instead of destroying the eminent domain analogy when confronted by this impasse, the Supreme Court created an artificial fair value, which was to be determined by "consideration" of such factors as original cost, the amount expended in permanent improvements, amount
and market value of bonds and stock, the present as compared with the
original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity under the con26
templated rates, and the sum required to meet operating expenses.
The term "consideration" has caused no little difficulty. Apparently
it should merely mean that the above factors should be thought over to see
if they have any relation to the rates that should exist, since the factors
themselves are as impossible to add together as are oranges and apples.
However, for a time the Court-in the O'Fallon case-27 singled out the
two factors of original and reproduction cost and held that "consideration" meant that both of them must be given weight "in the legal sense"which meant that a Commission could not think them over and then reject
one as unreliable; it must add some portion of the differential to the
smaller amount, though the Court spurns any "formula" which will tell
22

U. S. Const., Amendments 5 and 14.

23

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed.

1014 (1894).
24 See R.

L. Hale, "Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility Rates-the Need for
a Judicial Restatement," 38 Col. L. Rev. 959; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24
L. Ed. 77 (1877).
25 Ibid.; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 S. Ct. 334, 29
L. Ed. 636 (1886).
26 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
27 St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 S. Ct. 384,
73 L. Ed. 798 (1929).
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the Commission how much to add. Perhaps this attitude has changed; in a
recent case 28 the Commission was allowed to disregard, as unreliable,
evidence of a higher reproduction cost because the plant had been purchased in a higher price period, so that the original cost should clearly
have been the highest and a higher reproduction cost was obviously er29
roneous. Now and then an, opinion has emphasized reproduction cost,
particularly if there has been a definite change in price levels.30 Occasionally as part of this cost, a going value which includes earning power
has been sanctioned, 31 but this would seem to depend upon the capitalized
rates and would absolutely destroy any ability to lower them, just as
would a strict eminent domain analogy. In two recent cases3 2 the Court
has refused to believe the evidence of higher reproduction cost because
the stockholders were getting big returns at the existing rates which the
company alleged to be confiscatory. In these two cases, the Court seems,
by considering what the stockholders get, to be deciding the case on the
basis of original investment, although perhaps it would not be realized in
a case where the contrast between returns and allegations was of a less
shocking degree.
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
being still nebulous, the attitude of our state Supreme Court may be of importance in determining valuations. In Public Utilities Commission v.
Springfield Gas and Electric Company,33 the Illinois Court reversed the
Commission's rate order because, though the order stated differently,
the Commission appeared to have considered only original cost, and because the Commission refused to include going value. The Court then observed, "It would be equally as unfair to the consumer to fix the rate at
a figure which would produce a reasonable income on a value determined
by the cost of reproduction new at a time when cost of construction is abnormally inflated, as it would be unfair to the public utility to compel it
to serve the public for a rate that would produce a reasonable income on
a value determined by cost of reproduction new at a time when the cost
of construction was abnormally low. Therefore it cannot be laid down as
a rule without qualifications that cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, is the only basis of valuation for rate-making purposes. It is equally
true that the original cost of construction, less depreciation, cannot be
held to be the only proper basis for determination of valuation for ratemaking purposes .... Each case must be considered on its own merits
28 Railroad Commission of the State of Cal. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302
U. S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 319 (1938).
29 State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 (1923).
so McCardle v, Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed.

316 (1926).
81 Ibid.

32 Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658, 78
L. Ed. 1182 (1934); Dayton P. & L. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U. S.
290, 54 S. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934).
209, 125 N. E. 891 (1920). See also Ill. Commerce Commission v. C.
s3 291 Ill.
& E. I. Ry Co., 332 Ill 243. 163 N. E. 664 (1928).
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and such result of value arrived at as may be just and right in each
case." ' 34 This would indicate that our Court leans toward the theory that
the "consideration" mentioned in Smyth v. Ames merely requires thinking over the factors, not "weight in the legal sense." However, in the instant case, the final valuation arrived at was higher than the original cost,
so that under either theory the decision can be supported.
After the allowable expense, 35 including depreciation, was deducted
from gross income, a net return of five per cent remained on the rate
base as set above. The Court held that such a return was not confiscatory,
in view of the fact that in 1936 the highest grade utility bonds yielded only
up to 3Y per cent, that between 1934 and 1936 first class utilities could borrow on bonds at a maximum of 4Y per cent and that average yield on best
bonds of railroads and industries during 1936 and 1937 ranged up to 4%
per cent. This company had borrowed several millions at 4 per cent.
Holding that the rate of return is to be tested by present-day conditions,
the Court decided that 5 per cent was not confiscatory.
However, bond interest rates should not be taken as governing. A
utility is entitled to a rate of return equivalent to that in other businesses
86
of similar risks; a return reasonably sufficient to attract investment.
the
bondholders
since
well
as
bondholders;
as
must
be
stockholders
There
have a lien on the assets, the stockholders should get a higher rate of
return.
(4) The Extent of Judicial Review of Administrative Rate Orders
Apparently the holdings of Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon
38
Borough37 and St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, to the effect that
where in a rate case a confiscation question arises, the Court must arrive
at a conclusion as to the issue of confiscation on its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts, since it is reviewing the legislative act of a quasi-legislative tribunal, are still law. The latter case, it is
true, states that there is a strong presumption favoring constitutionality
39
after a hearing by an administrative body.
34 Public Utilities Com. v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 291 Ill. 209 at 222,
125 N. E. 891 (1920).
35 The Company sold many gas appliances on a trade-in agreement to win
new customers. The Commission disallowed this item as an expense. "Since
gas appliances are sold by many other dealers and those sales made by the gas
company, if conducted as a separate business, would not be subject to regulation
as a utility, the advisability of such a method of promoting sales of gas and
of the propriety of the amount thus expended becomes a matter entirely for
31 at 65. But does it? Has the Commission a right to
the commission." 373 Ill.
substitute its theories of business management for those of the Company?
36 United R. & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 S.Ct. 123, 74 L. Ed. 390
(1930).
37 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920).
38 298 U. S.38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
39 "But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach to findings
upon hearing and evidence. On the contrary, the judicial duty is performed in
the light of the proceedings already had and may be greatly facilitated by the
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Some of the language used in the instant case renders doubtful whether our court complied with the rule set down by these cases. In discussing
the value of the land, the Illinois Court dismisses the Chancellor's valuation because based on conflicting expert testimony and observes, "We
cannot say the value fixed by the commission was shown to be unreasonably low."' 40 In sustaining the Commission's valuation of other property,
the Court states, "The record is replete with testimony of percentages of
depreciation, obsolescence, replacement and maintenance, which it was
the province of the commission to consider and analyze."'41 Depreciation
cost is dismissed with the observation that the "commission is presumed
to be an expert body itself, and the fixing of the amount allowable for
annual depreciation was entirely within its province, which we are not at
' 42
liberty to disturb unless we find its action arbitrary or unreasonable.
All of this indicates a desire to effectuate the "strong presumption"
of validity which was mentioned in the St. Joseph Stockyards case. However, it would seem that this presumption, like all other presumptions, is
for the trial court to consider when hearing the evidence. The Supreme
Court, in thus giving the Commission a reasonable range of discretion
rather than giving it to the trial court as is done in usual cases, has placed
the Commission in the position of the Chancellor, its decision absolutely
final if supported by substantial evidence, which is exactly what is forbidden by the Ben Avon case. This is almost exactly what the Pennsyl43
vania Supreme Court was reversed for doing in the first Ben Avon case,
when it considered only whether the Commission's order had any substantial evidence to support it. After the reversal of this case, the controversy again came back to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and that
court held that "now, better advised, we give that effect to the findings of
the latter [the trial court], because it is the 'judicial tribunal' whose
'independent judgment' is required. . . .,44 The same discretion has
45
been given the trial court in such proceedings by other state courts. It
is because of this that Mr. Justice Stone dissents.
Such a procedure is perhaps sustainable upon the theory that, beassembling and analysis of the facts in the course of the legislative determination. Judicial judgment may be none the less appropriately independent because
informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency.
Moreover, as the question is whether the legislative action has passed beyond
the lowest limit of the permitted zone of reasonableness into the forbidden
reaches of confiscation, judicial scrutiny must of necessity take into account
the entire legislative process, including the reasoning and findings upon which
the legislative action rests. We have said that 'in a question of rate-making
there is a strong presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after a full hearing.' " At 298 U. S. 53, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80
L. Ed. 1033 at 1042.
40 373 Ill. 31 at 51.
41 373 Ill. 31 at 56. Italics are the author's.
42 373 Ill.
31 at 60.
43 Borough of Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 260 Pa. 289, 103 A. 744
(1918).
44 Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 271 Pa. 346, 114 A. 369 at 372
(1921).
45 See Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Com., 126 Kan. 220, 268 P. 111 (1928).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

cause of the dignity and importance of the Commission and its findings,
the Supreme Court has itself become a trial court, considering the evidence and giving effect to the presumption of validity. There is a United
States Supreme Court case which expresses the attitude that such should
be the procedure. 46 It is submitted, however, that such action efficiently
undermines the independent judicial review of the Ben Avon case. Per47
haps this is desirable; the case has been the subject of fiery discussion.
And perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States, in denying appeal 48
despite the language in the instant case, is launching upon an attitude
that shows a much less tender regard for the doctrine of independent
judicial review.

ROBERT W. BEIRGSTOM

46 "The purpose of this suit is to arrest the operation of a law on the ground
The constitutional invalidity should be manithat it is void and of no effect ....
fest, and where that invalidity rests upon disputed questions of fact, the invalidating facts must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. In view of the
character of the judicial power invoked in such cases it is not tolerable that its
exercise should rest securely upon the findings of a master, even though they
be confirmed by the trial court. The power is best safeguarded against abuse by
preserving to this court complete freedom in dealing with the facts of each case.
Nothing less than this is demanded by the respect due from the judicial to the
legislative authority. It must not be understood that the findings of a master,
confirmed by the trial court, are without weight, or that they will not, as a
practical question, sometimes be regarded as conclusive. All that is intended
to be said is, that in cases of this character this court will not fetter its discretion or judgment by any artificial rules as to the weight of the master's findings, however useful and well-settled these rules may be in ordinary litigation."
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 at 8, 29 S. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371 at
378 (1909).
47 See Brown, "The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public Utility

Rate Regulation," 38
by Courts in Appeals
of Law?" 1 Ind. L. J.
48 84 L. Ed. (Adv.)

Harv. L. Rev. 141; Merrill, "Does 'Legislative Review'
from Public Utility Commissions Constitute Due Process
247.
649 (1940).

